| European
Tropical Forest Research Network |
ENTITLING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN FOREST MANAGEMENT: HAS DECENTRALISED FOREST MANAGEMENT AFFECTED CHARCOAL PRODUCTION PRACTICES IN EASTERN SENEGAL?
By Maaike Snel and Johan Post
In accordance with Senegal's decentralisation policy, important forest management tasks, including the right to allocate charcoal production rights, have been transferred to rural councils. We have investigated the impact of these institutional reforms on charcoal production practices using the environmental entitlement framework developed by Leach et al. (1999). The study clearly showed that decentralisation has not been able to alter forest management practices at the local level, although official rights and responsibilities have changed.
The problem of legitimacy
The environmental entitlement approach of Leach et al. centres on the three
concepts of endowments, entitlements and capabilities. Endowments refer to the
rights and resources that social actors have, while entitlements are defined
as 'the alternative set of utilities derived from environmental goods and services
over which social actors have legitimate effective command and which are instrumental
in achieving well-being'. Capabilities then refer to the outcome - in this case
charcoal or the revenue form the sale of charcoal. The rural councils have not
been able to turn their new endowments into entitlements because they lack sufficient
strength and legitimacy. Rural councils were created in the 1970s and 1980s
as part of the first deconcentration efforts of the Senegalese state, yet even
after extending their formal rights they have never been able to compel (let
alone cooperate efficiently with) the respect and legitimacy certain traditional
institutions still enjoy. This has complicated efficient and effective decentralised
forest management, because forest management rights and responsibilities have
been transferred exclusively to formal institutions. The decentralised structure
of forest management moved the spotlight onto an institution that is rather
marginal in the organisation of rural society and not downwardly accountable.
As a result, the only person really benefiting from entitlements is the president
of the rural council. His access to entitlements and their translation into
capabilities (benefits from logging) is based entirely on his liaison with informal
institutions. The Senegalese charcoal production and marketing is mainly dominated
by merchants who provide access to charcoal markets, labour and capital for
cutting wood and turning it into charcoal and by forestry agents who officially
sanction woodcutting and trade. Informal institutions, notably the coalition
between merchants, state agents and village chiefs, continue to run the charcoal
business and are hardly affected by decentralisation efforts. The institutions
formally responsible - the rural councils and the forest service - are easily
influenced, overruled or ignored by the informal institutions.
Stakeholders and power
relationships
Decentralisation has not really affected the power relationships that underlie
the distribution of entitlements to charcoal. The claim of Leach et al. (1999:
238) that 'institutional change in society may be a slow, path-dependant process,
even if formal institutions, such as legal frameworks… change quickly'
is certainly true of the Senegalese charcoal production and trade.
Although tensions between pro-exploitation actors and pro-conservation actors are evident, the pro-exploitation actors' firm grip on the informal institutions will probably lead to a prolonged subversion of the laws that seek to enhance local control and sustain the forest.
The local community is not homogenous in their opinion on the charcoal production and trade: those who benefit economically from charcoal production have a different opinion than peasants who merely suffer the adverse effects of production. Due to the different popular needs and priorities, decentralisation to a genuinely representative institution would not automatically lead to ecologically sustainable forest management. Even if the rural councils were to function as democratic and representative institutions, the outcome of their forest management would be uncertain in terms of sustainability.
Efforts to improve the record of the decentralisation policy in terms of more effective local control over forest resources and more sustainable use of natural resources have not too much to build upon. Attempts by some rural councillors and villagers to persuade the rural council to use its legal powers to this effect have broken down in the face of opposition by the local establishment and merchant class (mobilising their political friends in Tambacounda and Dakar). This attests to the link between macro and micro-level developments as mentioned by Leach et al. The impact of the alliance between state and capital that characterises the overall Senegalese political economy manifests itself at the local level, affecting local processes of endowment and entitlement mapping.
Conclusion
In the short run it is unlikely that there will be a marked change for the better
. Only through a process of empowerment - probably with a crucial role for NGOs
to provide access to vital information and to educate and train people - can
one hope that countervailing forces will gradually gain strength and that people
will become more successful in effectuating the claims that decentralised forest
management should provide.
Reference:
Leach, M., Means, R. and Scoones, I. (1999). Environmental entitlements: dynamics
and institutions in community-based natural resource management. World Development
27(2): 225-247.
Further information:
Maaike Snel
Rapenburgerstraat 163 D
1011 VM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
E-mail: maaikesnel@hotmail.com