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ETFRN NEWS 39/40: Globalisation, localisation and tropical forest management

Organisations - Institutions - Programmes

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VIII THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Localisation as discussed here refers to the devolution of land rights and authority over natural resources to local population and user groups and lower level authorities. It has been argued that decentralised systems of forest management can lead to more sustainable and equitable use of resources, as decision-makers are located closer to, and are more directly involved in, the resource to which their policies and interventions refer. Decentralisation is also supposed to enhance more local participation in recourse allocation decisions, greater accountability and more sustainable use of natural resources. On the other hand, decentralisation and devolution of land rights brings new actors into the arena, with potentially conflicting interests, objectives, mandates and values - not least with central government agencies previously responsible for forest and natural resource management. Decentralised power also allows lower level authorities to raise local revenues, thereby creating an incentive to exploit the forest beyond sustainable levels. The following articles discuss to what extent and under which conditions decentralisation and devolution of land rights can stimulate more democratic and sustainable forest management.

CENTRAL CONTROL OF LOCAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: THE IMPACTS OF DEVOLUTION

By Eva Wollenberg, Bruce Campbell, Sheona Shackleton and David Edmunds

Devolution policies have sought to transfer control over natural resource management (NRM) to local people. Yet the state has continued to control the terms of most devolved NRM initiatives. While there are legitimate roles for the state, we question whether a better balance needs to be sought between local and 'wider' NRM interests . We summarise the extent to which such balance has occurred, drawing on Asian and African case studies.

Who controls and makes decisions?
The case studies showed that central authorities continued to drive the NRM agenda, despite the rhetoric. Except in cases in which NGOs or donors played a strong role, governments determined the nature of the shifts in control. In most instances they retained key aspects of management authority, placing tight constraints on local decision-making and sometimes rendering it meaningless. Most fundamentally, governments did not entrust people with rights to own the land and resources.

Thus, proprietary rights over resources such as wildlife were devolved to a local level in Namibia, Zambia and Botswana. However, governments continued to determine off-take quotas and communities were largely prevented from hunting game for subsistence. In India and the Philippines, government officials controlled planning, supervised the budgets and decision-making processes of local organisations and, in the former, controlled the marketing of timber and valuable forest products. In only a few cases did local people acquire land ownership (e.g. Maluleke case in South Africa).

In terms of organisations receiving devolved authority (Box 1), arrangements that transferred authority directly to disadvantaged people tended to be more responsive to local needs than those that allocated control to higher levels such as local government or district structures. Where community-based corporate structures were able to engage in autonomous planning, local residents had recognised rights to determine their own boundaries and membership, select their management structures and procedures and develop their own constitutions, by-laws, sanctions and management plans. They also received benefits of up to 100%. In some countries a demand-driven movement to establish such initiatives more effectively was emerging. The China cases were noteworthy for the relative independence that communities enjoyed under household and shareholding arrangements. By contrast, committees that were created by forest departments tended to be upwardly accountable to them and enjoyed little independence. Where communities already enjoyed autonomy and benefits under self-initiated management, devolution policies sometimes resulted in a loss of decision-making authority and benefits.

Local capacity: the key to making devolution more responsive to local interests?
The degree of organisation amongst poor resource users and their knowledge of their rights was a critical factor influencing outcomes. Where local people were well organised and had alliances with NGOs or other influential groups, they managed to secure greater control and benefits. In Maputi in the Philippines, local users had a forest management agreement with outsiders revoked, thus protecting local access; in Orissa, India, federations of forest user organisations pressed government to honour agreements about rights to benefits. Where local people were aware of their rights and knowledgeable of the constitutions that guided their NRM committees, they were able to challenge elitist behaviour within committees.

Towards a better balance of state and local roles

Box 1: Organisational foundations of devolution

The types of organisations that exercised 'local' authority and the direction of their accountability had a strong influence on whether the outcomes were favourable for local people. The following organisational models were identified:

  • District organisations such as district councils (e.g. Zimbabwe), Panchayats (India), multi-stakeholder structures aligned to line departments (e.g. Wildlife Management Authorities - Zambia, forest farms (China). The measure of downward accountability varied from very little to modest.
  • Village committees facilitated by government departments, e.g. Forest Protection Committees in India. Here, accountability related to the degree of control transferred by the state and the extent to which local elites took over the process.
  • Corporate, legal organisations composed of all rights holders/residents, e.g. Trusts (Botswana), Conservancies (Namibia) and Villages (Tanzania). Since the legitimacy of these organisations is derived from the community, interference by the state was less pervasive than in the preceding arrangements.
  • Household-based and individual management (China, Philippines), where individuals exercised varying degrees of authority over tree management and use. The state maintained control by providing access to technology, permitting systems, planning requirements, fees and taxes.
  • Self-initiated organisations operating outside of the state. Cases ranged from traditional institutions to Residents Associations and shareholding schemes. Self-initiated schemes were often accountable to disadvantaged users, but were often co-opted by elites or officials in the absence of a supportive policy and laws.

 

Acknowledgements:
We would like to thank the case study authors involved in this research and the donors who provided funding (USAID, the European Union, CSIR (Pretoria) and the IFAD).

Further information (including about references):
Dr Lini Wollenberg (l.wollenberg@cgiar.org) and Prof. Dr Bruce Campbell (b.campbell@cgiar.org), CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia
Sheona Shackleton (s.shackleton@ru.ac.za),Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
David Edmunds, Consultant (edmundsdavid@hotmail.com)

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