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FORESTRY AND CONSERVATION
ACTIVITIES DURING A WAR
FOUGHT OVER LAND AND
RESOURCES IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO
By Terese B. Hart and Robert Ducarme
During the recent civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) there was a parallel walk out of private companies from forestry, and international organisations from conservation. Furthermore, the semblance of state authority in national level institutions which existed in the eastern tier of the country before 1998, dissolved as militias splintered, terrorized towns and appropriated forest domains. Now, during a period that a beleaguered population hopes is post-conflict, reconstruction is slow, dependent on demilitarization and withdrawal of “personalised” foreign ambitions.
Throughout this entire period, there has been a continuous drain of minerals, logs and ivory from the forests of eastern DRCongo into neighbouring countries. The volume of this exodus of wealth is reaching tsunami proportions without any trickle back to an institution capable of improving the situation of local people or the future prospects of their children. Protected Areas are being stripped and legitimate industry shackled.
Northeastern DRCongo with three entirely forested protected areas (Okapi, Maiko and KahuziBiega) was disconnected from the capital and the western 2/3 of the country during civil war. This is the area of highest biodiversity in DRCongo and includes the Albertine Rift with its versant towards the central Congo basin. In this whole area there is but a single Forestry enterprise, ENRA, with an operational concession that had legal status prior to the war and has continued to function throughout the war.
Pre-War conservation
During the decade preceding the war, the
Government of DRCongo (then-Zaire) had
greatly diminished its investment in its
parks and reserves. These relied
increasingly on international conservation
funding; however, about the time the cold
war ended and following violent student
repression in southern DRCongo, multilateral
and bi-lateral funding for conservation
all but disappeared. International support
for a failed regime dwindled: The European
Union had made large investments both in
Virunga National Park and in Salonga
National Park. It withdrew from both. The
World Bank was in the final stages of
confirming Global Environment Facility
funds (GEF) for conservation work in Maiko
and Okapi parks. It too terminated project
development. Although UNDP stepped in
and drafted an alternative GEF document in
1996 at the very beginning of the conflict,
this multi-million dollar initiative never
became operational throughout the
following seven war-pocked years.
The largest international conservation NGOs began to draw back as well, reducing their presence to a “wait and see” mode only in the most “visible” of the protected areas.
Pre-war forestry
In the latter half of the 1980s various forestry
companies proposed concessions along a major road being built by German and
Chinese companies linking Kisangani to
Bukavu. Construction on the road itself was
abandoned when foreign aid withdrew, and
the concessions were abandoned before
they went beyond the early stages of
negotiations.
On the other hand, around the major inland city of Kisangani, the most upstream port on the navigable section of the Congo Rriver, many active forestry enterprises were fully active up to the outbreak of war. This was the source of the profitable Afrormosia, as well as a major area of exploitation of African mahogany and particularly limbali.
War and Conservation
As the first waves of war ran over eastern
DRCongo a few international conservation
NGOs continued to support the protected
areas but their expatriate representatives
left the country. Usually the NGOs worked
in a single protected area and had trained
an important professional Congolese
cadre. The first steps, therefore, consisted
of re-establishing communication and
salaries for national employees. These
NGOs were able to respond because their
sources of funds, although far more modest
than those of the multi-lateral organisations
came from less politically sensitive sources
(private donors-USA who had tax breaks for
charitable gifts, international zoos…) The
only bilateral donor that continued to be
involved was the German organisation,
GTZ.
In all cases the determination to stick with a park through war was dependent on the decision and determination of certain committed individuals who then convinced their organisations.
A coalition of these NGOs, together with the national conservation institute, ICCN, approached UNESCO and the UN Foundation (UNF) for emergency support. A war-time grant for World Heritage Sites in danger was launched. Operational early in 2000, and disbursing funds through the still active NGOs, this was the most visible external donor. In actuality, however, several other non-private sources of funding were critical, also operating through NGOs. These included the U.S.Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and U.S. Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) as well as continuing support from the German government (GTZ).
It was this combination of backing that enabled ICCN with its NGO partners to make any stand at all against militia-facilitated poaching and mining.
War and forest enterprise
On several occasions Kisangani became the
arena for prolonged and particularly brutal
fighting. Pillaging was general and all
enterprises, including forestry operations,
were victimized. All foreign- owned and -run
forestry enterprises shut their doors and let
off their employees. Nor was there any
market outlet from Kisangani after 1998 and
the division of the country. The Congo River
was closed to all traffic towards the Atlantic
port and the only overland option to the east
(Indian Ocean port) was a single road in such
disrepair that, within DRCongo, throughout
most of the war the main commerce was
carried out by bicycle caravan. This is still
the case, post-conflict.
The single legal concession that continued to operate, ENRA is located near the busy border town of Beni, where it also has a factory for conversion to parquet flooring, crafted doors and carved furniture. The prewar outlet to markets outside of Africa was the Kenyan port of Mombasa, but ENRA also served domestic markets. Even during the war there was an important local market as the riches of the Albertine Rift created a small but wealthy elite among Congolese and particularly foreign neighbours.
The price of non-worked wood, however, fell precipitously in the east; liboyo planks of 2" at the Ugandan border were sold at 175$ m3 whereas in the west of the country sale price was more than 300$ m3. This happened through a flooding of the market. First, local authorities (collectivités), no longer receiving any revenue from the state, distributed forest-cutting rights liberally providing themselves with profit and their local population jobs cutting and carrying. These collectivité revenues were treated as personal, rarely funding such desperately needed public services as schools, hospitals or roads. Second, trucks loaded and accompanied by military exported wood without paying any taxes at all. They thereby profited at a much lower sale-rate. The result is a general unplanned depleting of accessible forest to produce only low-quality planks and unsawn logs.
Despite the anarchy of private forestry in eastern DRCongo, the biggest uncontrolled loss of forest is the result of population explosion and uncontrolled immigration of farmers. In a block of 22,000 ha of the ENRA concession, 13,000 ha were destroyed by illegal agricultural clearcuts leaving only 9000 ha for exploitation. This remaining area was itself invaded by farmers after a first forestry cut, making any attempt at sustainable forestry impossible. Aerial surveys over the region have led to the estimation of agricultural penetration into the forest of about 1 km a year along a front of several tens of km.
Post-war
Conservation and forestry have the same
fundamental needs, unambiguous national
laws concerning land tenure and resource
rights and a state strong enough to enforce
them. The Democratic Republic of Congo
is working towards a revision of the pertinent
laws; but the transition to a state able to
enforce them will be long.
Until the state itself has not only the institutional structures in place but the ability to make them functional, there must be strong political will nationally and responsible international partnerships. For conservation, in the immediate and medium-term, a form of international sponsorship of the parks is essential. For forestry, guarantees to investors will have to be based on confidence in a functional partnership between the state and the international community.
For further information please contact:
Terese Hart
WCS/DRC country director
E-mail: teresehart@aol.com
Robert Ducarme
Managing director ENRA
E-mail: enrabeni@yahoo.fr
Postal address:
Terese Hart
WCS/DRC country director
International division- WCS
185th St and Southern Blvd
Bronx, NY 10460
USA